There are (at least) three ways to look at the current situation around the Lebanese-Israeli Blue Line:
- With the Lebanese army and a vastly expanded UNIFIL filling in the void created by the disengagement between Hizballah and Israel, there is a reasonable probability that things will stabilize in the area: Lebanon will get a new lease on its sovereignty, there will be greater alignment for a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon, and one more front in the Arab-Israeli conflict will go away.
- Hezbollah has been beaten enough into the ground that Iran and Syria will abandon the Nasrallah surrogacy for the foreseeable future. There may be a low-level conflict between Hezbollah and the Lebanese army, with occasional intervention by Israel on the Lebanese side, but Hezbollah is no longer a major player in regional politics.
- The radical factions in the Arab world sees Hezbollah as the victor in the war and models further warfare against Israel, the US, and pretty much everyone else on the Hizballah model, which is pretty familiar to what mobsters would do - take over an area, combine bribes, good works, etc., with intimidation and violence, and then attack an enemy using ruthless tactics. In this case, the 2006 war on Hizballah is simply a portend to much worse to come.
The predictions cover all these three, and then some, but I don't think anyone really knows for sure. The dust hasn't settled.
The UN Security Council was moved to call for a ceasefire in order to stop civilian casualties, and it's hard to hold that against them, morally. (Though one has to wonder why they are so slow to put an end to much worse humanitarian crises elsewhere). The plan is predicated entirely on the first scenario, which really is a victory for Israel (and Lebanon!) if it works.
But if 3) is the case, the ceasefire will rank among the worst follies in recorded history. Because if hostilities break out again, UN soldiers will be caught in the crossfire and will probably have to fight their way out. Without a doubt, Israel will facilitate an evacuation/retreat through their lines; but these things get messy, and Hizballah will have every incentive to create an outrage.
Given the extreme difficulty the UN has in assembling the troops for this mission, it would appear most people believe scenario 3 is the most likely. In which case one could almost hope for the ceasefire to end as soon as possible, so that Israel can get back to work destroying Hizballah. Of course (if you're not already confused), if scenario 3 is not in the cards, a resumption of Israeli offensive actions will seem cruel, disproportionate, and belligerent not just toward Hizballah but Lebanon.
I think it is time that Arabs, Israelis and the Western world develop a shared outlook on radical elements in their midst. (Sharon and Olmert showed considerable moral and physical courage in evicting Jews from Gush Katif, and it can't be easy seeing thousands of families stuck in trailers and hotels when they were running innovative agricultural enterprises in what is now rapidly becoming desert again. Anyone who doubts that the Israeli government is willing to make tough decisions and sacrifices as a gesture of goodwill, better look at the story of former Jewish residents of Gaza.)
It is particularly important that the Arabs get on the bandwagon for this. There has to be a program for social reform in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan; and Lebanon shouldn't give up the momentum that was started in the Cedar Revolution. Iraq seems so much more complicated, but there has to be an approach for solidifying the moderate elements and giving them the means to defend themselves.
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