Maybe it's simple fatigue, but the endless op-eds you'd expect to find about the political implications of Operation Summer Rains aren't that easy to find. The Norwegian Socialist Left party wants to recall Norway's ambassador to Israel, which probably won't happen, and wouldn't make one iota of difference if it did.
There are lots of predictable reactions, of course. Those on the anti-Israel side feel it's an overreaction, an attempt at re-occupying Gaza, collective punishment, subversion of Palestinian democracy, a war crime, etc., etc. Those who support Israel on principle defend the operation because it has a just military rationale (rescuing an abducted citizen) and took place in the context of unbearable provocations (something like 800 Qassam rocket attacks in less than a year).
There is talk of an uncontrolled escalation, the Norwegian UN official Jan Egeland is scolding everyone and warning of a humanitarian catastrophe. Arab heads of state are expressing their outrage, etc., etc.
Here's my take:
The fact that Hamas is now officially in power makes a huge political difference in Israel. No longer can a PLO-controlled PNA absolve themselves of responsibility for hostile acts against Israelis; it is the same group that launches the Qassam attacks that is officially in power, and so Israel can hold a government responsible.
The international community was probably dismayed by the Hamas victory but asked Israel to give it all some time - when Hamas had to take responsibility for the smooth operation of Gaza's sewage systems, they'd become responsible leaders and ultimately the partners in peace so badly needed.
Israel was skeptical, to put it kindly, and it didn't help matters much that these Qassam rockets kept coming during the much-publicized but not terribly discernible ceasefire Hamas talked about.
The truth is that Hamas, PIJ, etc., are running out of weapons. The barriers that hinder movement in and out of Palestinian communities on the West Bank and Gaza have made suicide bombing, sniping, and other such "remote-controlled" events much more impractical, and it's questionable whether they worked, anyway.
Abductions are another matter altogether. Though it's costly, attacking an Israeli position is always possible (after all, the positions are a vanguard), and taking Israeli soldiers plays like capturing a prisoner of war in the public mind. Israel can not afford to let that tactic work and has in fact every interest in making it utterly counterproductive.
Saving Gilead Shalit is not a trivial operation, and what some call "overreaction" is simply a consequence of military doctrine held most places these days: the best way to achieve a military objective is to apply overwhelming force, rendering resistance futile and thereby making the whole affair fast and relatively bloodless. Israel is keeping the door firmly shut on anything that looks like a concession to the kidnappers, while Hamas keeps saying they don't want to return Shalit for free.
Then there is this talk of escalation. Israel has arrested numerous Hamas members who are officials in the PNA, destroyed Gaza's only internal power generator, bombed PNA offices, etc. IAF fighter planes buzzed (one of) Bashar Al-Assad's home(s) while he was there, surely rattling his cage quite a bit. Egypt made a futile (but I have to say admirable) effort to mediate a deal. It is unclear what the IDF will do next in Gaza, and Ha'aretz reports that Israeli intelligence has no idea where Shalit actually is - some think he has long since been moved to a hostile Arab states; there are after all quite a few to choose from.
If Hamas (or what is left of it) hand over Shalit:
- Israel will happily move out of Gaza, and international aid organizations will rush in assistance to rebuild the civilian infrastructure, scowling at Israel as they do so.
- The arrested Hamas leaders will remain in custody and will stand trial.
If Hamas doesn't produce Shalit:
- Israel will move deeper into Gaza, destroying more of Hamas and its brethren terrorist organizations;
- then probably redeploy in a way that limits Gazans to a relatively simple life, but probably without much of a government
- More Hamas leaders will be arrested, possibly also on the West Bank.
I can understand the perspective that Israel did this to turn Palestinians against the Hamas government, but I don't think it's quite that simple. There are mutterings in Israel that the unilateral disengagement from Gaza was a big mistake, and though it can't be reversed, Israel does feel a need to demonstrate its ability and willingness to inflict damage on Palestinian forces. Also, the impasse between the Hamas and Israeli governments is unsustainable beyond the very short run: there must either be an honest confrontation or visible progress against the peace process.
Israel interpreted the Qassam attacks and the abduction of Shalit as casus belli and picked up the gauntlet.
The measures of success of the military operation are best known only to Israeli intelligence and the Palestinian leadership - to the extent that Summer Rains demonstrated not just military ability but also intelligence reach, it may scare the shit out of Palestinian leaders who think that victory over the Zionists is possible. After all, military victory over the Palestinians has long since been achieved; what remains - especially if you believe Daniel Pipes - is the psychological victory. The Palestinians must be convinced that they have much more to lose by continuing to fight than they have by negotiating earnestly.
It is too early to tell if Summer Rains makes a contribution one way or another. Israel's next steps are crucially important - if they stay too long in Gaza, they look like bullies; stay too short, and it will look like they were scared off. Of course, Western anti-Zionists already believe the former, and radical Arabs will always choose to believe the latter. But somewhere in the mix are people shrewd and sophisticated enough to draw the right conclusions.
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