The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned a study from the International Peace Research Institute to learn more about the Norwegian government's role in the so-called Oslo agreement.
Per A. Christiansen at Aftenposten, Norway's leading daily, presents a (Norwegian) preview of the findings, with the headlines "Norway and Israel misled the US about the Oslo channel." This is one of several points Christiansen cites as evidence that Norway favored Israel over the PLO in the negotiations. The pivotal point is that Israel as the "strongest party," was in a position to demand more than the Palestinians, who were - according to the study - most anxious to get a peace process going.
This appears to be a widespread opinion among many Norwegians, that the peace process failed because Israel had the upper hand, being so enabled by parties that should have acted as honest brokers. It remains to be seen whether the report accepts this as a premise. If pundit consensus in Norway is any guide, this would only be one of many possible fallacies that might render the whole analysis useless at best, counterproductive at worst.
There is clear evidence that PRIO fell victim to this fallacy. To quote from the introduction to the report:
The Oslo peace process reflected the fundamentally asymmetrical power situation that existed between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Israel was the stronger party; it possessed a clear national security agenda and was unwilling to make too many concessions. The PLO, on the other hand, despite its strong vision of a future Palestinian state, was willing to make significant concessions in order to avoid further marginalization of itself and the Palestinian cause. What room for manoeuvre did such a basic asymmetry of power provide for the Norwegians?
There is no question that the Arab-Israeli conflict is asymmetrical, but there is more to the asymmetry than the imbalance of arms between the State of Israel and the PLO. To illustrate the point, let's look at two sources of asymmetry: military power (ability) and ruthlessness of action (will). There are many conflicts in which one party has both the military power and the ruthlessness, and these lead to wholesale slaughter of the opposition, such as the Jordanian war against the PLO. In cases where both parties are equally powerful and ruthless, a bloody war results, such as that between Iraq and Iran.
Palestinian - and indeed most Arab - leaders have shown willingness to be as ruthless as necessary to further their cause, whereas Israel has proven itself superior in military power but has held on to the principle of purity of arms. The result is a conflict in which Israel's military advantage is more than offset by the fact that the Israeli government is held accountable to courts, the Knesset, public opinion, and the world community. The PLO has no effective courts, no functioning legislative body, a highly fragmented public opinion; and the global community seems to avoid holding them accountable for their actions.
The further premise that Israel wasn't willing to concede "too much" (who would?) and the Palestinians "significantly" doesn't hold up to subsequent events. All Israel asked for to start negotiations was that the PLO give up terrorism and that it recognize Israel's right to exist. At the signing of the declaration of principles outside the White House, Arafat was asked to fulfill three requirements: 1) that he not arrive with his pistol; 2) that he wear a suit and not a military uniform; and 3) that he publicly denounce terrorism as a means of the PLO. Of these three requirements, he fulfilled only one: he left his gun in the airplane before arriving at the White House.
There are probably other examples in the report that demonstrate PRIO's ignorance and bias, but the main point was to examine Norway's role in all of this.
The role of a mediator - in international and civil affairs - is to facilitate agreement among parties whose best alternative to a negotiated settlement is very poor. A mediation is only successful if a) both parties participate voluntarily; and b) there is a possibility for a settlement. Mediation is different from arbitration in that the parties do not submit to a binding outcome. In other words, the mediator has no ability to commit the parties to a resolution.
Whereas the US conceivably could act as an arbitrator in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Norway could only hope to be a mediator. There are advantages to this role, though: the parties are more easily able to accept the mediator as someone whose main interest lies in achieving a settlement that both parties can freely commit to.
To blame Norwegian mediators for not leveling the playing field between Israel and the PLO is to ignore what mediation is all about. The mediator's job is to openly acknowledge and work within the real constraints that exist. It is precisely because the mediator has no power that he/she can effect a rational negotiation.
As critical as I am about Norwegian statesmanship and diplomacy, I am not sure that the Norwegian participants can be blamed for all that much. The main purpose of the Oslo accords was to create a framework for further, more substantive negotiations. In the crazy world of international affairs, negotiating on how to conduct negotiations is often more complex than anything else.
It's laudable that the Norwegian MFA wants to examine what they could have done to ensure (or at least increase the probability of) a better outcome from the "peace process" that was started in and around Oslo. But to do this, they'd have to start with defining the criteria for success for Norway's participation.
The risk here is that by a) simply assuming that Israel is to blame for the breakdown of the process; and b) Norway enabled this in the early phases of the process, the Norwegian government decides that it can only mediate successfully if it tries to level the playing field somehow.
I can't help but think that the Norwegian ministry of foreign affairs had to make a choice when commissioning this study. They could have gone with a Norwegian outfit or they could have gotten a useful, actionable report. This shouldn't be a choice at all - the MFA should not ask for a report it wasn't willing to act on.
As it turns out, Terje Rød Larsen, one of the people directly involved in the Oslo discussions, has directed devastating criticism at this report. He characterizes the findings of the report as "wrong," the choice of sources "skewed and weak," and source review is "weak." The result, he says, are a "dramatically wrong" conclusions. He denounces the treatment of the late foreign minister, Johan Jørgen Holst, as "unworthy" and "false."
Tip of the hat to (Norwegian) document.no, here:
http://www.document.no/weblogg/archives/001500.html
Posted by: Leif | April 26, 2004 at 01:49 PM